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Abstract—We propose a model of operation for next generation
wireless Internet, in which a mobile host has hundreds of
“disposable” Mobile IPv6 home addresses. Each correspondent
is distributed a different disposable home address. If attacked on
a given home address, the mobile user can block packets to that
address and become unreachable to the attacker. Blocking one
address does not affect other addresses. Other correspondents
can still reach the mobile host. A new home address can also
be requested via e-mail, instant messaging, or directly from
the target host using a protocol that we develop. This model
is especially useful against battery exhausting Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks and CPU exhausting distributed DoS attacks, since
it seems to be the only viable solution, currently. We show
however that this model can also be used to defeat other attacks
and also to stop spam.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the next generation Internet, it is estimated that billions
of hand-held IP-addressable mobile phones will be directly
connected to the wireless edges of the Internet, obseleting
today’s cellular telephony architectures. These devices will be
equipped with VoIP (Voice over IP) software and standard IP
applications e.g. Web browsing, instant messaging, file transfer
etc. Users will enjoy constant wireless Internet connection
regardless of their location i.e., not only in hotspots, but also
in urban and rural areas.
In order to support such a large number of Internet hosts
(mostly wireless and mobile) the next generation internet
protocol, i.e., the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)
standard IPv6 which provides 128-bit addresses will probably
be used [1]. A mobility management solution will also be
needed to help mobile hosts receive packets regardless of
their location i.e. current subnet. The IETF standard Mobile
IPv6 (MIPv6) is currently viewed as the strongest candidate
to address the mobility management problem[2].
In MIPv6, the mobility is handled at the IP layer. Mobile
hosts are IP-addressable and are constantly connected to the
Internet. The Internet is, however, a hostile environment where
malicious parties can easily eavesdrop voice and data traffic,
impersonate other users, mount Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tacks, infect them with viruses and worms and mount other
attacks. Encryption and authentication solutions are available
to defeat eavesdroppers and impersonators, however DoS
attacks are particularly difficult to cope with since the Internet
was designed to route any packet to its destination. Malicious
packets can be sent to a destination in order to consume its
resources, e.g. energy and CPU cycles. These attacks that
we call battery/CPU exhaustion attacks will be particularly
important as far as mobile users are concerned, since mobile
hosts are battery-powered and their CPU power is limited.
Attackers may also exploit buggy code to obtain unauthorized
access or degrade performance, or infect victim hosts with
viruses and worms, etc. Finally, SPam over IP Telephony
(SPIT) will also be a potential problem in next generation
Internet.
In this paper, we propose a solution to these attacks. Our
proposal is called disposable home addresses (see next section
for a review of Mobile IPv6) and inspired from the disposable
phone numbers and e-mail addresses that are in use today.
In our proposal, MIPv6 home addresses are used as phone
numbers. A mobile user distributes a different disposable home
address to each of their correspondents. If attacked on one
of the home addresses, the compromized address is canceled,
i.e. disposed of. Other correspondents that were distributed
other home addresses are not affected. They can still reach
the mobile host. New disposable home addresses can be
remotely requested by e-mail or instant messaging, however,
we also develop a protocol for directly requesting a disposable
home addresses form the target mobile host. This model is
especially useful against battery exhausting DoS attacks and
CPU exhausting distributed DoS attacks, since it seems to be
the only viable solution, currently. We show however that this
model can also be used to defeat other attacks and also to stop
spam.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section III
describes the problem that we address in this paper, Section
IV describes the disposable home address solution that we
propose, Section V proposes a protocol for distributing home
addresses, Section VI proposes a solution to the same problem
without assuming the existence of a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI), Section VII proposes a solution to the SPIT (SPam over
IP Telephony) problem, Sections VIII, IX, X provide discus-
sions of some architectural considerations, some limitations
of our proposal and implementation considerations and finally
Sections XI and XII present related work and conclusions.
II. MOBILE IPV6
The Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) model of operation is illustrated
in Figure 1. In MIPv6, a mobile host is assigned two IP
addresses. The first one is called a home address (hoa). It is a
ar
X
iv
:1
10
3.
51
15
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
6 M
ar 
20
11
23
Packet
tunneled
@coa
update (coa)
Binding
1
2
Session
initiating
packet
@hoa
Visited network
(coa)
home agent
Mobile host
node
Correspondent
(triangular routing)
Binding update (coa)
4
Fig. 1. MIPv6 model of operation (simplified).
fixed address that points to the mobile host’s home network,
where a special router called home agent serves the mobile
host. When away from home, each time a mobile host visits
a new subnet, it configures a new address called a care-of-
address (coa). The mobile host then sends a binding update
message to its home agent reporting its current care-of-address.
Consequently, the home agent always knows the current IP
address of the mobile host.
When a correspondent node needs to establish a session with
the mobile host, it sends a packet to the mobile host’s fixed
address which is the home address. This packet is intercepted
by the home agent and tunneled to the mobile host’s current
care-of-address. Upon receipt of the packet, the mobile host
decapsulates the packet and obtains the original packet sent
by the correspondent node. The mobile host has now the IP
address of the correspondent node and sends a binding update
message to the correspondent node. The correspondent node
consequently learns the current IP address of the mobile host
and the two hosts can communicate directly without the help of
the home agent. This optimization is called route optimization
or triangular routing. An alternative mode of operation is
called bidirectional tunneling, in which a binding update is
not send to the correspondent node. The mobile hosts’s reply
is reverse tunneled back to the home agent which decapsulates
the packet and sends it to correspondent node. This packet’s
source address is the mobile host’s home address. This mode
of operation is generally prefered for location privacy. The
location i.e. current care-of-address of the mobile host is
hidden from the correspondent node.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we present several Internet attacks that can
be mounted against next generation mobile hosts. We espe-
cially focus our attention on battery/CPU exhaustion attacks
since currently disposable home addresses seem to be the only
defense against these attacks. However, other types of Internet
attacks e.g. port scanning, attacks that exploit buggy code,
spam or any future attack that we cannot foresee can also be
defeated using the proposed solution.
By current practice, it is assumed that a higher-layer iden-
tifier e.g. a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)[3] or if
(Session Initiation Protocol)[4] is used, a SIP URI (Uniform
Resource Locator) will be resolved to a home address and
the destination mobile host will be reachable at that address.
Consequently, an attacker who learned these identifiers can
mount attacks against the obtained home address.
One solution to these threats is to keep these higher-layer
identifiers secret and not sending them in clear-text over the
Internet (the latter being a pre-caution against eavesdroppers).
We feel however uncomfortable with this approach. Mobile
host identifiers need to be shared for communication and we
believe that they may easily leak to the hands of malicious
users and attackers.
A. Battery exhaustion attacks
In wireless communications, energy is a scarce resource
since terminals are battery powered. Most link-layer wireless
access protocols support a mode called dormant mode, or
power save mode in which the network interface consumes
much less energy. In this mode, the receiver circuits are mostly
off, and they are periodically switched on to check if a packet
was received while the terminal was in dormant mode, and
buffered by the access point or base station. This optimization
is very important because listening consumes an important
amount of energy and terminals are idle (i.e. not sending or
receiving) most of the time. Transmitting consumes even more
energy, and in power save mode, terminals do not transmit
frames.
In cellular access technologies, dormant mode is possible
in a much larger area than a single cell. Cells are grouped
into paging areas, i.e., each paging area contains a large
number of cells and covers a large geographical area. When
moving within paging area boundaries, a terminal remains in
dormant mode and does not report its exact location (cell) to
the network and conserves energy. When there is an incoming
call, however, the network needs to page the terminal in its
current paging area. This is achieved by broadcasting a paging
message in all cells of the paging area. The terminal then
wakes up, reports its exact location and the call is delivered.
An attacker (located anywhere in the Internet) who learned
the home address of a mobile host, can mount a DoS attack
by continuously sending packets to that address. This attack
would consume the energy of the target mobile host by
preventing it from entering power save mode and forcing it
to send reply packets (and possibly link-layer ACKs returned
to the leaf router or access point). This is a fundamentally diffi-
cult problem. It needs addressing because an important source
of energy consumption in a battery powered mobile device
is the network interface. Note that the energy consumption
problem here is two-fold:
• Victim is deprived from sleep mode (network interface)
• Victim is forced to transmit reply packets (link-layer
ACKs and upper layer reply packets e.g. TCP SYN/ACK,
or SIP OK)
It can be noted that two kinds of attacks are possible. In
the first one, the attacker may only want to deprive the victim
from power save mode. Let T the time duration a victim
3waits before entering sleep mode when it is not in active
communication. The victim can be deprived from sleep mode
by sending 1/T packets per second. In the second attack,
the attacker can send more frequent packets and force the
victim to send reply packets and consume more energy in
addition to sleep mode deprivation. In this paper, we assume
the second type of attack. The attacker sends as much packets
as possible in order to exhaust the victim’s battery. If the attack
succeeds, the device may become completely unavailable until
its battery is recharged. The user who may not have foreseen
such premature battery outage may not have their charger
with them, or a place to recharge the battery may not be
immediately available.
Experiments showed that an infrastructure mode 802.11
equipped HTC mobile phone’s energy (full battery, 1350
mAh) can be consumed in ∼ 3.5 − 4 hours by continuously
sending it ICMP echo request (ping) packets1. Under normal
conditions, i.e. without attack, the phone survives ∼ 1 day
without recharging (802.11 activated but idle). Note also
that the attacked phone’s battery was full. The attack may
shut down a target mobile device much more quickly if its
battery level is low. Attackers can probably obtain better
results against outdoor technologies. Cellular terminals usually
have larger distances to the base stations, requiring more
power to overcome low signal-to-noise ratio[5]. I.e., replies
to malicious packet will need to be transmitted at a higher
power, consuming the victim’s battery more quickly.
Note that a simple solution e.g. filtering the attacker’s IP
address would not work because the attacker can randomly
spoof source IP addresses. End-to-end authentication solutions
(e.g. IPsec[6]) also do not solve this problem, since the packet
is dropped by the target, which is too late. Energy is consumed
for receiving the packet, possibly generating a link-layer ACK,
and the target is deprived from link-layer power save mode
since it is continuously receiving (and dropping) packets.
B. CPU exhaustion attacks
CPU exhaustion attacks aim to consume a victim host’s
CPU cycles by continuously sending it requests e.g. ICMP
echo request, TCP SYN, SIP INVITE etc. The victim host will
continuously process the requests, prepare replies and send
them back to fake sender address(es). Depending on its CPU
power, the victim’s performance may be degraded to the point
that it cannot be used during the attack.
Note that if IPsec is used, packets from untrusted hosts will
be quickly dropped without consuming more CPU cycles[6].
However, this assumes that the target host has an IPsec security
association with every trusted host in the Internet.
1In these experiments the Linux command ping -f target was used, which
sends a new ping packet as soon as a reply is received to the previous one,
i.e. without waiting one second. In practice the mobile phone may silently
drop ping packets. However, an attacker can also send other request packets
e.g. TCP SYN, or SIP INVITE which cannot be silently dropped, otherwise
the target may deny service to legitimate session initiators. For experimental
purposes sending ICMP echo requests is not different from sending TCP SYN,
or SIP INVITE. The impact on the target phone is the same. Using the ping
command also allows us to test the effect of different payload sizes.
More importantly, an attacker can exploit the Internet Key
Exchange (IKEv2) protocol of the IPsec protocol suite[7]. In
IKEv2, CPU expensive cryptographic computations are made
in response to an IKEv2 initiation request. A well known
DoS attack consists of sending an outstanding number of
IKEv2 requests and consume the victim’s CPU cycles. IKEv2
supports cookies in order prevent an attacker from spoofing
their IP address. In response to an IKEv2 initiation request,
the responder returns a cookie in order to check the return
routability of the initiator. Only if the initiator used its real IP
address it will receive the cookie. A legitimate initiator then
repeats its request with the received cookie. The responder,
concluding that the initiator is legitimate (i.e. not spoofing IP
addresses), proceeds with CPU expensive cryptographic com-
putations that are necessary for key agreement. Consequently,
an attacker is forced to use their real network address which
can be blocked if frequent requests are made from the same
address.
Note however that an attacker can organize a Distributed
DoS (DDoS) attack in which thousands of compromized hosts
attack using their real address (the attack would probably
target many mobile hosts). In this case, cookies would be use-
less since attacking hosts use their real address and blocking
thousands of addresses without denying service to legitimate
initiators is a difficult task. A different solution is therefore
necessary.
C. Other attacks
Other attacks may also be mounted against future mobile
hosts. For example attackers may port scan a target host to
find about vulnerabilities, try to obtain unauthorized access or
infect the target host with a virus or worm.
D. SPIT: SPam over IP Telephony
Similarly to e-mail, VoIP systems are likely to be abused by
malicious parties who initiate unsolicited and unwanted com-
munications. Telemarketers, prank callers, and other telephone
system abusers are likely to target VoIP systems. This problem
is refered to as SPam over IP Telephony (SPIT)[8].
Unlike battery and CPU exhaustion attacks, this threat is
an application-layer threat and disturbs the user in a different
way. We show in this paper that the same solution that we
develop against battery/CPU exhaustion attacks can be used
to fight SPIT.
E. Location privacy attacks
An attacker located anywhere in the Internet can peri-
odically send packets to a victim’s home address without
establishing any session, forcing them to send unnecessary
binding updates (in route optimization mode) and reveal their
location.
IV. DISPOSABLE HOME ADDRESSES
In the proposed model, a mobile host generates a large
number of random disposable home addresses pointing to
its same home network by sending a home address request
4message to its home agent2. Each time Alice is requested her
identifier (a home address which is in this case equivalent to
a phone number) by another user, she picks a different home
address generated by her device and tells it to the peer user if
both users are present (refered to as “user contact”) or sends
via e-mail if the request was made by e-mail.
When the user moves from one network to another, it
configures a new care-of-address as defined in [2] and sends
a binding update for one of its home addresses. In our case,
a binding update sent for one home address must update the
care-of-address binding for all of the home addresses of the
mobile host. I.e., the mobile host can receive an incoming
session to any home address that it previously configured and
distributed.
Let hoai be one of the home addresses of Alice’s battery-
powered mobile device. When idle, i.e. not in active commu-
nication, Alice’s device is assumed to enter power save mode
in which the network interface consumes much less power.
As described above an attacker who learned the address hoai
may attack that address. The attacker may remotely consume
the victim’s energy and/or CPU cycles or mount other attacks
as described above.
Since Alice has distributed a different home address to each
host in her address book, she can block the packets addressed
to hoai. Upon detecting the attack (receipt of an unusually
large number of packets to hoai), Alice’s device needs to send
a message to its home agent to indicate that packets destined to
hoai should be dropped (upon user command). Alice’s device
should also configure a new care-of-address (and send to its
home agent in a binding update message) if the previous one
was sent to the attacker for triangular routing. Clearly, the
attacker’s packets will not reach Alice’s device anymore. If
in active communication with a legitimate correspondent, that
node must also be sent the new care-of-address using a binding
update message.
If Alice receives an incoming session from another user, the
session will be destined to the home address hoaj , which will
be allowed. Blocking one home address does not affect the
incoming sessions to other home addresses. Note also that the
attacker has no knowledge of the home addresses distributed to
other users, thus cannot easily attack another address. When
the attack on hoai stops, Alice can reactivate that address.
Alternatively, the correspondent user that were provided with
address hoai, can request another address by e-mail, instant
messaging or using the home address distribution protocol that
we describe in Section V.
An IPv6 address is 128-bit long: 64 bits network address and
64 bits interface identifier. The total number of home addresses
in a home network cannot exceed 264. This is not an important
problem since 264 is a huge number. For example, if 10,000
mobile hosts are served by the same home network and each
host has 200 peers in their address book, hence 200 home
2In MIPv6 a mobile host has an IPsec security association with its home
agent, hence home address generation is secure. When generating home
addresses, address collisions can also be detected by the home agent which
has a list of all home addresses in the home network.
addresses, then 2×10
6
264 ' 2 × 10−12 of the available address
space in the home network will be in use.
V. DISTRIBUTING DISPOSABLE HOME ADDRESSES
A. Protocol description
As described above, in our proposal, home addresses are
used as phone numbers (disposable ones). A disposable home
address can be shared when there is user contact by verbal
communication, or remotely by e-mail, instant messaging
etc. In this section, we develop a protocol for requesting
a disposable home address from a target host directly. This
protocol will run between peer contact manager applications
(see below for benefits).
In this model, each mobile host has a prime home address.
A disposable home address is first requested from the target’s
prime home address and the call is made to the returned
disposable home address. Incoming calls to the prime home
address are not accepted, and an error message is returned
by the target host indicating that a disposable home address
must be requested. The prime home address is registered to the
DNS and mobile hosts (and hence their users) are identified
by the corresponding FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name).
Users can share their FQDN when there is user contact
through verbal communication or remotely by e-mail, instant
messaging etc.
Using the proposed protocol, illustrated in Figure 2, Alice’s
phone can remotely request a disposable home address from
Bob’s phone which is located anywhere in the Internet. The
same protocol can be used when there is user contact, i.e.
Alice and Bob are both present. Alice enters Bob’s FQDN
to her contact manager application which makes a disposable
home address request to the target mobile phone’s prime home
address. The request contains Alice’s name and possibly other
information about Alice, and if possible the request should
be signed with Alice’s private key and her certificate must
be attached. Upon receipt of the request, the peer application
on the target phone displays a message indicating that Alice
requests a disposable home address and ask Bob’s permission
to return the requested address. If Bob accepts, the address is
returned and Alice’s phone can make a call to that address.
Bob’s reply containing the disposable home address must be
signed using Bob’s private key, and Bob’s certificate must be
attached. Note that Alice does not deal with disposable home
addresses. She simply makes a call to Bob in her address
book and the contact manager requests a disposable home
address if necessary and makes the call. The call is made to
the disposable home address. If the disposable home address
given to Alice is compromized and used for an attack, Bob
will block this address as previously described. In this case,
Alice’s phone will request a new home address when needed.
This protocol brings the following advantages:
1) Ease of use: Users are less concerned with disposable
home addresses since they use FQDNs. They may even
ignore that they need one to reach the target host (see
below for exceptions). User enters the target FQDN to
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Accept? [YES/NO]
home address.
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HIP solution
Request home address
HIP test
Request home address,
Fig. 2. Protocol description (details omitted).
the contact manager which requests a disposable home
address from the target phone if needed, and makes a
call to that address.
2) Speed and reliability: Using the protocol described in
this section, a disposable home address can be requested
quickly and more reliably. Using e-mail, the requesting
user needs to wait until the target user checks e-mail (if
push e-mail is not used) and the e-mail servers may be
temporarily down, unreachable or congested. Using the
proposed protocol, the home address request is directly
made to the target host.
3) Publishing a FQDN on the Web: Alice can publish her
FQDN on the Web and distribute a different disposable
home address to each correspondent that request a
home address. This is advantageous over publishing a
disposable home address directly, in which case mul-
tiple correspondents would obtain the same disposable
home address. If that address is disposed of, all these
correspondents would lose contact with Alice.
An attacker who learned Bob’s FQDN and attacking the
his prime home address can be defeated by blocking that
address address. In this case, the proposed protocol will be
temporarily disabled. Correspondents that were previously
distributed disposable home addresses can still reach Bob,
however. Home address requests can still be made by verbal
communication, e-mail, or instant messaging (clearly, in this
case, the users should be aware of disposable home addresses).
In Section V-C, we discuss this attack’s efficiency in more
details.
B. Human interaction proofs
When Alice requests a home address from Bob’s device, a
message will be displayed on Bob’s device’s screen, asking
permission to return the requested information. This request
will interrupt the target user and we see here a potential abuse.
A malicious user who obtained a target user’s FQDN may
repeatedly make fake requests over the Internet in order to
disturb the target user, forcing them to repeatedly pushing on
NO button and eventually disabling the protocol. This attack
would be similar to calling the target user and quickly hanging
up. The attacker does not obtain anything, but disturbs the
target user. Consequently, in such cases, we would like to
ensure that the initiator user makes some relatively harder
work compared to the burden put on the target user, i.e.
checking the request and making a decision.
In order to prevent spam bots from obtaining a large
number of e-mail accounts, HIP (Human Interaction Proof)
tests also known as CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) are used
today[9]. As malicious character recognition programs become
increasingly intelligent, the HIPs also become more and more
difficult to read by humans. There is anecdotal evidence that
some users do not comment on blogs when they are required to
solve a HIP. Therefore, in our case, HIPs are good candidates
to prove hard human work and defeat attackers who try to
disturb users with bogus requests displayed on their screen. In
the proposed protocol, when frequent home address requests
are received by the target device, a HIP is returned to the
initiator user, and before a notification is displayed on the
target screen, the initiator must first present the correct answer.
The difficulty of the HIP problem can be adaptively in-
creased if the requests are too frequent, which is a sign of
anomaly. For example, longer CAPTCHAs can be returned.
C. Simulations
In this section, we present a simulation analysis of the above
described home address distribution protocol. In the presented
scenario, Alice, upon buying a new mobile phone, publishes
her FQDN on the Web and has no contact initially. She has 200
potential correspondent users which find Alice’s FQDN on the
Web, make a disposable phone number request from Alice and
make a call. Unfortunately, however, an attacker also learns
Alice’s FQDN, and hence her prime home address, and mounts
battery exhaustion DoS attacks against Alice. The attack
consists of continuously flooding the target phone with bogus
requests during several hours. We assume that when under
attack the prime home address is disabled and consequently
correspondents’ disposable home address requests are rejected.
Consequently, the attack’s impact is not battery consumption,
but rejecting incoming calls from legitimate correspondents.
Correspondents who obtain a disposable phone number (when
there is no attack) can make further calls even if the prime
home address is disabled.
In the first simulation, the attacker mounts a 4-hour attack
against Alice’s mobile phone, everyday, where the attack
begins at 8:00, 12:00 or 16:00. During a day, the probability of
making a call to Alice is 1200 for each of 200 correspondents
and the calls are made between 8:00 and 20:00, i.e. during
one of the above three attacks periods. Thus, the probability
that a call coincides with an attack is 13 × 13 = 19 . If a
disposable phone number was not previously obtained and the
call coincides with an attack (i.e. the prime home address is
blocked), the call is rejected. In the second simulation, the
attacker mounts a 6-hour attack which begins at 8:00 or 14:00.
In this case, the probability of rejecting a call is 12 × 12 = 14 .
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Fig. 3. Rate of rejected calls during 1,000 days of attack (hypothetical).
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3. In the first
simulation, a few calls are rejected, where some calls are still
being rejected after 250 days. A total of 18 out of 1,993 calls
are rejected (0.9%). In the second simulation, more calls are
rejected and even after 500 days a few calls are being rejected.
A total of 56 out of 1,993 calls are rejected (2.8%).
We believe however that better results can be expected in
practice. In practice, correspondents can also obtain disposable
phone numbers through other channels e.g. user contact, e-
mail, or instant messaging etc. The only impact of the attack
would be therefore forcing a small portion of the correspon-
dents (the rejected ones in Figure 3) to use e-mail, or instant
messaging for requesting disposable home addresses. This is
not as user friendly as using the described home address
distribution protocol but still acceptable. Consequently, we
believe that this attack has a low damage/effort ratio3 and
3We define the damage/effort ratio as the measure of the seriousness of the
damages caused by an attack compared to the attacker’s efforts. In this attack,
negligible damage is caused by mounths of persistent attack. Hence, it has a
low damage/effort ratio.
hence is probably unrealistic in practice.
VI. CERTIFICATELESS OPERATION
So far we have assumed that a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is available. When Alice makes a disposable home
address request to Bob, the request is signed with Alice’s
private key, and Bob’s answer is also signed with Bob’s
private key and certificates are attached to the messages.
Consequently, Bob is certain that the request was made by
Alice, and Alice is certain that the returned home address
belongs to Bob.
However, if a PKI is not available, the attached certificates
will not be verifiable and consequently an attacker can im-
personate Alice and/or Bob. For example, by impersonating
Alice, an attacker can obtain a home address and attack Bob.
Or, by impersonating Bob, and attacker can return her own
address and act as a man-in-the-middle.
In this section, we propose a solution to address the case
where a PKI is not available.
A. User contact available
When user contact is available, i.e. both users are present,
the protocol that is illustrated in Figure 4 can be used for ex-
changing disposable home addresses and authentic certificates
for future use.
Here, we use the theoretical mutual authentication protocol
described in [10]. When Alice makes a home address request
to Bob (by typing his FQDN), her device first generates a
long random string Ra, computes a secure hash hash(Ra)
and sends it along with her public key PKa. Bob’s device
generates its own random string Rb and sends it along with
Bob’s public key PKb. Alice’s device responds by sending
Ra. Bob’s device computes the secure hash of Ra and
compares it with the previously received hash(Ra). If they
do not match, Bob’s device aborts (not shown). Otherwise
it continues. Alice’s device computes and displays a SAS
(short authentication string) (n-bit hash, where n = 15...20)
out of Ra, Rb, PKa and PKb. Bob’s device computes
and displays the same. Alice reads the SAS to Bob through
verbal communication (since both users are present, i.e. user
contact is available). Alice and Bob compare the received SAS
with the one their device computed and displayed. If they
do not match, they abort (not shown). Otherwise the devices
store each other’s public keys, and securely exchange home
addresses.
This protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Refer to [10] for a security proof of the protocol4.
Since Alice and Bob securely exchanged their public keys,
they can update disposable home addresses later when there is
no longer user contact. For example, when an attacker learns
4This protocol is actually a solution to the public key distribution problem
without PKI. Users, however, are generally not aware of public keys. By
integrating this solution into a phone number (disposable home address in
our case) exchange protocol, we also contribute to better security in mobile
IP telephony. Users are more likely to run a contact management protocol
than the pairing protocol described in [10] alone. In this approach, phones
get paired when phone numbers are exchanged.
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Fig. 4. Protocol description (certificates not available)
the disposable home address that was given to Alice, Bob can
block that address and Alice can request a new one.
B. User contact not available
If user contact is not available, certificateless operation is
not secure in the absence of a PKI as described above. In
this case, the users can use e-mail or instant messaging to ex-
change home addresses since these applications are password
protected.
VII. FIGHTING SPIT
The proposed model of operation can also be used against
SPIT (SPam over IP Telephony). If a user that was given the
disposable home address hoai uses it for sending unwanted
messages or make disturbing phone calls, the address hoai can
be blocked. The malicious user may request another address,
however the target user can reject the request.
For example, this model can be used to defeat disturbing
calls and messages from a known user e.g. someone met in a
party or telemarketing calls from a previously met salesman
who was given a disposable home address.
VIII. ARCHITECTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the proposed model of operation, a mobile host (and its
user) is identified using a FQDN, which can be viewed as
a phone number. The FQDN is resolved to the host’s prime
home address and disposable home addresses are requested
from that address. A host can change its prime home address
address at any time and register it to the DNS using dynamic
DNS[11]. Disposable home addresses can also be viewed as
phone numbers (disposable ones) since a user can use them
directly.
It can be noted that SIP URIs in the form of user@provider
are not used[4]. End-to-end SIP can be used for session
establishment (using IP addresses or FQDNs as SIP URIs),
however the proposed model is independent from the SIP
architecture, i.e. the SIP proxies are not needed. Mobility is
managed by MIPv6. Since it does not rely on SIP infrastruc-
ture, the proposed model is more reliable against single points
of failure.
Our proposal is however backward compatible, i.e. some
users may use the standard model using SIP infrastructure
using a fixed single home address at the risk of battery/CPU
exhaustion.
One problem with our proposal is offline messaging. In
cellular systems, when a target mobile terminal is not online,
the caller can leave a message. The message is stored by the
network and delivered when the target becomes online again.
For this, application-layer solutions are generally necessary,
however in our case we do not use application-layer infras-
tructure. No infrastructure is used other than the Mobile IPv6
home agent and the DNS, and an offline messaging system
cannot be possibly integrated into these systems. One solution
to this problem is to deploy a peer-to-peer SIP telephony
protocol as described in [12]. In this approach, the initiator
records a voice message and uploads copies of its message
to a number of hosts that are online. Each host can then
periodically try to forward the message to the target host until
it becomes online. Details, e.g. optimizations, of this solution
fall out of this paper’s scope.
IX. LIMITATIONS
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with remote at-
tackers located anywhere in the Internet, attacking a particular
known victim’s globally reachable home address. This, we
believe, is the most serious case since attacks are possible
regardless of the victim’s location.
However, an attacker located in the same cell as the victim,
can also learn its MAC address and consume its energy by
continuously sending packets to that address. Our solution
cannot cope with these attacks. However, upon moving to a
new cell, the victim can escape from the attacker.
The care-of-address may reveal the identity of a mobile
user if the interface ID part of the address is constructed
from the globally unique MAC address. [13] describes privacy
extensions for IPv6 where the interface identifier is randomly
generated. An attacker may however decide to attack random
care-of-addresses in the same subnet. Our solution cannot cope
with these attacks. Similarly, the victim can escape from the
attacker upon moving to a new subnet or by configuring a new
care-of-address.
X. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
Our problem in this paper is basically a home address
management problem. It can be implemented at the application
layer. The home address management protocol that we de-
scribe will run between the mobile host’s contact manager and
a server application run by the home agent. In this approach,
the user makes a home address generation request to its contact
manager which sends the request to the home agent. The home
agent generates an address and configures it for the mobile
host. Detecting address collisions is not a problem since the
home agent knows all home addresses in its network. The
8trafic between mobile host and home agent is protected using
IPsec, since they have a security association.
The contact manager application on the mobile host should
periodically monitor the mobile host’s trafic, and run intrusion
detection algorithms5. Upon suspicious activity, it should warn
the user and upon user command, block the subject home
address by sending a request to the home agent. The home
agent should deconfigure the home address. Packets sent to
that home address should no longer be served and they should
be silently dropped by the home agent. The host should also
deconfigure the home address.
Upon blocking the home address, the mobile host needs to
configure a new care-of-address and send to its home agent,
otherwise the attacker can still reach the mobile host at its
care-of-address (if route optimization is used). If bidirectional
tunneling method is used, changing the care-of-address is not
necessary since the care-of-address is hidden from the attacker.
In this approach, the contact manager applications on dif-
ferent devices also communicate with each other in order
to request disposable home addresses using the protocols
described in Section V.
XI. RELATED WORK
A. Disposable identifiers
Our proposal was inspired by disposable phone numbers
that are in use today[14][15]. Disposable phone numbers are
used for coping with unwanted correspondent users. Each user
is given a different disposable phone number and if one of the
users show malicious behavior (e.g. make unwanted calls) the
phone number that was given to that user is canceled.
Disposable e-mail addresses are also in use today, as an al-
ternative way of sharing and managing e-mail addressing[16].
A user distibutes a different e-mail address to each correspon-
dent user and if anyone compromises it for any e-mail abuse,
the address-owner can easily cancel it without affecting any
other contact.
In our case, i.e. in IP telephony, lower level threats also
exist, e.g. CPU/energy exhausting DoS attacks as discussed
throughout the paper. Consequently, we applied this disposable
identifier solution at the IP layer, by proposing disposable IP
addresses, i.e. disposable home adresses. This way we can
cope with both problems, CPU/energy exhaustion DoS attacks
and SPIT, using the same solution.
B. Battery/CPU exhaustion attacks
In [17], the authors warn about so called “sleep deprivation”
attacks in the context of mobile ad hoc and sensor networks.
This attack consists of periodically sending packets to a victim
in order to prevent it from sleep mode.
In [18], the authors offer a thorough analysis of denial-of-
service attacks on battery-powered mobile computers. In this
paper, three main attack methods are described: (1) service
5In this paper, we do not enter into the details of host-based network
intrusion detection algorithms that can be used by the mobile host, since
this is a much broader topic which falls out of this paper’s scope. Different
implementations may use different techniques.
request attacks, where repeated requests are made to the victim
for services, typically over a network, (2) benign power attacks
where the victim is forced to execute a valid but energy hungry
task repeatedly, and (3) malignant power attacks where the
attacker modifies or creates an executable to make the system
consume more energy than it would otherwise. Our work is
different in that we assume that the attacker cannot obtain
access to the victim host, and services like ssh are deactivated.
In our case, the victim consumes energy for receiving request
packets and returning replies. A session is never established.
Energy is consumed although the attacker does not obtain
access to the target mobile phone.
Key agreement protocols e.g. IKEv2 which employ the
Diffie-Hellman protocol, are vulnerable to CPU exhaustion
attacks since they rely on CPU expensive operations like
exponentiation. An attacker can repeatedly make key agree-
ment requests forcing the victim to continuously make CPU
expensive operations. A well-known solution to these at-
tacks is client puzzles[19]. Upon receipt of the initiator’s
key agreement request, the responder returns a puzzle. The
puzzle is difficult to solve but the proposed result is easy to
check. For example, the responder returns a nonce N and
the initiator is requested to find a solution X such that the
first k bits of hash(X|N) are zero. The only way to find
the solution is brute force, i.e. trying all possible solutions.
The solution is easy to check and consists of computing
hash(X,N). Consequently, the attacker makes much more
work than the victim, which slows down the attack. This
solution can be used to defend against CPU exhaustion attacks,
but energy is still consumed for receiving packets (deprived
from power save mode) and responding with puzzle requests.
In addition, an attacker may orchestrate a DDoS attack using
tens of thousands of compromized hosts and consequently
use much higher CPU power than the victim(s). I.e., each
host participating in the attack may need longtime to solve
the requested puzzles, but the overall attack performance may
be good enough to exhaust the CPU/battery of victims(s). A
different solution e.g. disposable home addresses is therefore
necessary.
C. SPIT
[20] provides a detailed analysis of the SPIT threat in the
context of SIP. The authors identify three threats: Call spam,
instant messaging spam and presence spam. They also analyze
the solution space and propose various solutions e.g. content
filtering, black lists, white lists, reputation systems, limited use
addresses etc. Among these solutions limited use addresses
are very similar to our proposal. The authors do not propose
a solution for SIP, but instead they bring to our attention
the use of limited use addresses for protection against e-mail
spam, where each correspondent user is given a different e-
mail address.
Our proposal is different in that we use disposable IP
addresses in order to overcome not only the SPIT problem but
also the battery/CPU exhaustion threats. We agree however
9that more than one solutions can be applied to the SPIT
problem.
D. Pseudo home addresses
In [21] the authors describe the use of a pseudo home
address to achieve location privacy. A pseudo home address
is used to replace the real home address in various messages,
which allows the mobile node to hide its real home address
from both the correspondent node and eavesdroppers.
E. Network ingress filtering
An alternative solution against Internet attacks is network
ingress filtering, which consists of dropping packets which
have topologically incorrect source address[22]. We believe
that this is a good solution in theory, however note that most
service providers to not employ ingress filtering. This solution
is also not effective against DDoS attacks in which the attacker
controls a large number attacking hosts which send packets
with their real IP address.
XII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed disposable home addresses for
Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6). In summary, the proposed solution will
help defend against the following security problems in future
mobile IP telephony:
• Battery exhaustion Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that
deprive a target host from sleep mode (important since
mobile hosts are battery powered and energy is a scarce
resource)
• Battery exhaustion DoS attacks that force a target host to
return reply packets and link-layer ACKs
• CPU exhaustion DoS attacks that force a target to process
incoming malicious packets and return replies
• CPU exhaustion DoS attacks that force the target to per-
form CPU-expensive cryptographic operations in IKEv2
(unlike client puzzles, defense is possible against DDoS
attacks)
• Disturbing calls and messages from a known user e.g.
someone met in party or telemarketing calls from a
previously met salesman (subset of the SPam over IP
telephony problem)
• Other attacks e.g. port scanning, or currently unknown
attacks may also be defeated
These defenses are achieved by distributing a different
“disposable” home address to each correspondent. When one
of the addresses is exploited for an attack, it is disposed of by
its owner i.e. the mobile user. Other correspondents that were
distributed different home addresses can still reach the user.
It is also possible to request a new disposable home address
when one of them is disabled.
It is noteworthy that the proposed model of operation is
only possible in IPv6 since a large number of mobile hosts
may be served by the home network and each mobile host
may have hundreds of disposable home addresses. In IPv6,
264 addresses are supported in a same subnet, which is much
more than enough.
The proposed model is especially useful against battery
exhausting DoS attacks and CPU exhausting distributed DoS
attacks, since it seems to be the only viable solution, currently.
We believe that these attacks are fundamentally difficult to
defeat and represent a considerable threat against comfortable
use of future wireless Internet. Without the solution proposed
in this paper, the only defense seems to be turning off the
phone that is under attack, for later use when the attack ceases.
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